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MOSCOW'S DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS

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PREFACE

This essay was originally written two decades ago as a seminar paper while I was a doctoral student at Harvard University. A substantial portion of it addresses what were then only the first steps toward the establishment of a community of professional civilian defense analysts in the Soviet Union. Throughout most of the intervening period, that community found itself mired in immobilism as jurisdiction over such key Soviet national security inputs as military doctrine, force requirements, resource needs, and, to a considerable degree, arms control negotiating positions remained an exclusive prerogative of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff.

Today, this former military monopoly has come to be challenged with increasing success by a host of newcomers to the Soviet defense scene, including the Foreign Ministry, the Supreme Soviet, and an ambitious cadre of civilian analysts attached to the social science research institutes of the Academy of Sciences. These individuals are making a determined bid for greater influence over Soviet defense policy, with the express encouragement of President Gorbachev and his supporters. The result has been an unprecedented infusion of pluralism into Soviet defense politics and a significant change in the content and goals of Soviet military policy.

In light of the renewed topicality which the Soviet civilian defense intelligentsia has lately acquired, I have decided to place my original study on the subject into the public domain for whatever historical background value it may offer. Aside from routine editing, what follows is unchanged from the original paper, which was written for Government 179, "Comparative Foreign Policy," taught by Professor James T. Kurth in 1969-70.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The burgeoning complexities of modern weapons and the concomitant multiplication of intellectual and managerial skills needed to cope with them have been among the most notable byproducts of the nuclear-missile age. These developments have broadened the arena of strategic policymaking and heightened its political importance. At the same time, they have generated new problems which the approaches of a simpler past have proven incapable of accommodating. The sophistication of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has made military resource allocation as much a matter for technical judgment as for political-military choice. The costs of modern armaments have added further complications as weapons have become forced to compete not only among themselves but with other national priorities. And the sheer destructiveness of modern weaponry has raised the deterrence of war to unprecedented primacy, making the adroit "nonuse" of nuclear power the quintessence of military strategy.

These phenomena share the common feature of placing a premium on variants of expertise which the military profession has traditionally not been disposed to develop.¹ As a result, they have tended to diminish the importance of the "purely military viewpoint" in strategic decisionmaking. The point here is not the oft-quoted assertion of Clemenceau that "war has become too important to be left to the generals." Rather, it is that the problems of devising and implementing a viable defense policy in the nuclear age have transcended the scope of

¹My point here is not to suggest that the officer corps is incapable of mastering these approaches. It is to say, however, as Thomas Schelling has pointed out, that although military professionals may have these broader skills, ... they do not automatically have them as a result of meeting their primary responsibilities, and those primary responsibilities place full-time demands on their time." *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 9. The military is anything but unaware of its difficulties in this respect. See, for example, Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964, pp. 255-268.

traditional military competence. Defense policy has become inseparably tied to foreign and economic policy, and new approaches have had to be found to deal with its demands.

The American response to these challenges has been a subject of considerable scholarly attention in recent years.² One of its more notable aspects has been the rise of an increasingly diversified community of civilian "defense intellectuals" within and around the circle of power. Some of these scholar-scientist-strategists have been directly involved in the policy process, often at the level of presidential decisionmaking itself.³ Others have populated a variety of government contract research institutions like the RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analyses, offering advice on problems of strategy while retaining a measure of detachment from the bureaucracy. Still others have avoided the nexus of government altogether, preferring to advance their contributions in a spirit of free inquiry from the university world.

Yet most of these individuals have shared a common assumption that the inductive, deductive, and empirical tools of the natural and social sciences are equally suited to the analysis of military problems. They have also operated from the premise that questions of national defense are not fundamentally different from any other social or economic problems facing the state. Their stock in trade has been a variety of analytic methods for enhancing the rationality of military decisions under conditions of uncertainty, including econometrics, systems analysis, technological forecasting, and the informed common sense of traditional policy analysis.⁴ The impact of these defense professionals on American strategic policy has been uneven, but it is undeniable that

²The literature on this topic is too voluminous to permit even a partial listing here. For one of the more useful sources, see Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, *Schools for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

³Among those in this category who immediately come to mind are McGeorge Bundy, Morton Halperin, Henry Kissinger, Walt Rostow, and Robert Osgood, all of whom have served or are now serving as White House advisers.

⁴For detailed discussion, see Robert A. Levine, *The Arms Debate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Arthur Herzog, *The*

their influence has been felt. Indeed, born as they have been of the imperatives of the nuclear age, it would be surprising if their effect were anything else. What Bernard Brodie a decade ago termed an "intellectual no-man's land" now seems to have become abundantly filled.⁵

It is a fair question whether the Soviet Union, also a major power with nuclear weapons, has undergone similar developments in its approach to defense issues. Such a question is not easily answered, for the closed character of Soviet society, the secrecy that the Soviets have traditionally attached to matters of military significance, and the limited reliability of Soviet source materials have all tended to circumscribe our ability to gain conclusive insights into the dynamics of Soviet policymaking.

Yet even in the absence of the hard forms of empirical data that have been readily accessible to students of politics in Western democratic societies, it seems reasonable to postulate that the Soviets have developed their functional counterparts to our "defense intellectuals." After all, if it is true, as the Soviets have forcefully asserted in their polemic against the Chinese, that "the atomic bomb does not observe class distinctions,"⁶ why should it not also be true that the policy imperatives of the atomic bomb apply with similar impartiality? Certainly the Soviet Union has been just as exposed to the demands of the nuclear age as the United States has been. Both superpowers have grown increasingly beset by common internal trends and external pressures. Both are modern industrial powers with complex social structures. Both are nuclear superpowers with comparably sophisticated technological capabilities. And both have encountered comparable experiences in their respective external commitments and

War-Peace Establishment (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); and Roy Licklider, *The Private Nuclear Strategists* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1968).

⁵Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 7.

⁶"Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to All Party Organizations, to All Communists of the Soviet Union," *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

responsibilities, internal managerial-technical revolutions, and national security imperatives.⁷ It would only seem natural that the heightened demand for specialized skills that has so revolutionized American strategic planning would also have come to affect the needs of our Soviet adversary.

How the Soviet Union has responded to this demand is the central concern of this paper. Its unifying theme is the idea that there are distinct institutional and functional groups in the Soviet system that have come to display hallmarks of a "defense intelligentsia" similar to that of the United States. Taking this argument as a point of departure, I will characterize these groups, examine the political circumstances that have spawned them, and suggest hypotheses about their possible functions in the Soviet defense community.

Such an effort confronts two levels of inquiry, the descriptive and the analytical. The first poses few demands. We can easily enough determine the institutional boundaries of the concerned groups, the most prominent individuals who populate them, and the styles of these individuals simply by studying the available documentary materials. The second, however, involves the sort of troublesome problems that have continually made Kremlinology a risky academic enterprise.⁸ Whatever we might be able to say, however conclusively, about the broad characteristics of the Soviet defense intellectuals, we must recognize a substantial margin of uncertainty in our efforts to assess their political influence because of the obscurity of Soviet decisionmaking.

⁷These points are among the main assumptions underlying the study by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1964). See particularly their discussion of comparisons and contrasts on pp. 6-9.

⁸Much has been written on the analytical challenges presented by these problems. For a pioneering effort to lay down a theoretical foundation for Sovietology, see Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences," *World Politics*, April, 1958, pp. 327-365. See also the following four articles in *Survey*, January, 1964, pp. 154-194: Arthur Adams, "The Hybrid Art of Sovietology;" Robert Conquest, "In Defense of Kremlinology;" Alex Nove, "The Uses and Abuses of Kremlinology;" and T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics."

As Alfred Meyer has observed, we simply "cannot know precisely how much, how often, and under what circumstances the men of the Party Presidium, the Secretariat, or the Central Committee consult experts in various fields. We do not know the channels through which such consultation takes place, the directness of access professionals have to the top politicians, or precisely what kind of experts do, and do not, have access."⁹ Lacking this necessary information, we are forced into the realm of speculation.

At the same time, this necessity for speculation hardly reduces us to the option of mere guessing. There is a wide range of circumstantial evidence which can offer significant insights into the role of the defense intelligentsia in Soviet politics. By examining the public statements of various Party and military spokesmen regarding the views of the defense intellectuals, for example, we can at least gain some feel for the extent to which the experts have managed to gain the attention of their primary audiences. And by comparing the opinions of these experts with observable developments in Soviet strategic planning, weapons deployment, and arms control proposals, we can also render tentative judgments about the way they have helped shape the contours of Soviet policy.¹⁰ Using both approaches, this paper will explore (a) the

⁹Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation* (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 457.

¹⁰This is not the place to engage in a side argument over the relative merits of alternative methods for studying Soviet politics. It bears noting, however, that some approaches currently in vogue among quantitatively oriented Western political scientists border on the absurd. As a case in point, one recent study proposed to "measure" elite involvement in Soviet politics by means of a random content analysis of arbitrarily selected Soviet newspaper articles (Milton Lodge, "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," *The American Political Science Review*, September, 1968, pp. 827-839). In its juxtaposition of supposed "elite beliefs" appearing in the lead articles of various Soviet journals, this study ignored such basic questions as whether the authors were speaking authoritatively and whether the journals themselves were representative of official Soviet thinking. As a result, however valid its tests of statistical significance may have been, the article revealed nothing instructive about Soviet politics. Successful Kremlinology requires both careful sensitivity to the context of events under assessment and an appreciation of the many uncertainties that always abound. At best, it is an elusive art for which there are few "scientific" techniques.

extent to which the defense intellectuals have been brought into the councils of strategic decisionmaking; (b) the degree to which they have been able to make their influence felt; and (c) the implications of their emergence for the future of the Soviet political system.

II. THE SOVIET DEFENSE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY

The existence and importance of professional skill groups in non-military sectors of the Soviet government have been widely recognized by Western students of Soviet affairs. These groups have emerged as a natural consequence of the growing demand for specialized expertise that the rapid industrialization, bureaucratization, and scientific-technical development of the Soviet Union have imposed.¹ As decisionmaking problems have gained in complexity and immediacy, the Soviet ruling elite have increasingly been forced to seek the advice and counsel of lesser functionaries possessing the necessary qualifications for dealing with them.

Indeed, the recruitment of these professional skill groups has become all but a *sine qua non* for the continued ability of the Soviet state to meet its responsibilities. As Frederick Barghoorn has put it, "the regime must permit managers, bureaucrats, natural and social scientists, and communicators to obtain the training and enjoy the conditions that they need to effectively perform their functions. Such performance, in turn, is required if Soviet domestic and foreign policy objectives are to be achieved."² The result has been a progressive erosion of the Communist Party's exclusive hegemony over Soviet society as mounting pressures have made the regime increasingly reliant on its specialists.

Observers of the Soviet military have noted similar trends in the defense arena. In his detailed study of post-Stalin Party-military relations, Roman Kolkowicz has observed a distinct evolution in the political role of the Soviet officer corps from its traditional pattern

¹The most closely studied of these groups to date has been the Soviet managerial elite. See, for example, Jeremy Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) and David Granick, *The Red Executive: A Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960).

²Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 382.

of submissiveness to a more active level of involvement. "The growing complexity and proliferation of military equipment and weapons," he has argued, "and the greater need for military professionals able to attend to them have set new boundaries to the Party's rule over the military, for they have heightened its dependence on the experts, forcing it to treat them with circumspection."³

It would be wrong, of course, to suggest that the heightened importance of the military factor in Soviet policy has yielded a proportional increase in the decisionmaking influence of the marshals. Like their American counterparts, Soviet political leaders have increasingly recognized the limited relevance of traditional military skills for addressing problems of nuclear strategy. Their paradox also has been that as the military voice has come to demand increased attention, that same voice has become less and less qualified to supply necessary answers to the difficult questions which Soviet strategy must confront.

One senior officer in the Main Political Administration of the armed forces, for example, was recently moved to observe that "Marxist-Leninists do not assign the role of generals absolute importance" and that "the time has long past when a general could direct his troops while standing on a hill."⁴ The writer went on to note Engels' observation that "the influence of even the most brilliant generals was at best limited to adapting the method of warfare to new weapons and to new types of fighting." Another commentator spoke of the diminished utility of military expertise created by "the complication and expansion of the scope and problems of strengthening the country's military power." He suggested that "the complex task of working out a correct military-economic and military-technical policy...and of

³Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 35. For a review of this book which addresses its theoretical dimensions and its broader contribution to Soviet studies, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Political Integration vs. Military Professionalism: A Soviet Civil-Military Dilemma," *Orbis*, Fall 1967, pp. 916-923.

⁴Major General V. Zemskov, "An Important Factor for Victory in War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 5, 1967.

determining properly substantiated proportions concerning the manufacture of various types of weapons and material" has demanded new levels of competence and responsibility which the officer corps alone is incapable of meeting.⁵ On one occasion, Khrushchev himself summed up his own views in a characteristically outspoken pronouncement: "I do not trust the advice of generals on questions of strategic importance."⁶

Because of the mounting economic and technical intricacies of Soviet military planning, two adjustments have had to be made: (1) military professionals, as the responsible managers of the Soviet defense establishment, have been forced to acquire the necessary skills to meet the new demands of their job; and (2) the Party leaders, as the responsible executors of Soviet defense policy, have had to seek out the additional sorts of specialized technical competence required to aid in rendering their decisions knowledgeably. The outgrowth of these imperatives has been the rise of a new technocracy within the military⁷ and the simultaneous appearance of a whole range of additional skill groups in other sectors of the Soviet national security community.

To be sure, these functional groups are hardly unknown to Western analysts. Soviet military technocrats, economic planners, and scientists have all been extensively studied within the confines of their respective institutional settings.⁸ Yet little attention has been

⁵Colonel A. Babin, "The Party--Leader of the USSR Armed Forces," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 6, 1967.

⁶Quoted at a Kremlin press conference, *New York Times*, November 9, 1959. Khrushchev's disparaging attitude toward the military was almost legendary. A disbeliever in the value of surface vessels in modern warfare, for example, he would often point to children's toy boats in ponds during strolls through Moscow parks with foreign visitors and describe them jokingly as "our navy," no doubt to the irritation of his admirals. Another illustration of Khrushchev's attitude toward his officers was offered in a remark he once made to Pierre Salinger during the latter's visit to one of the Soviet Premier's country *dachas*. The two men were practicing at shooting clay pigeons with shotguns. When Salinger proved to be the inferior marksman, Khrushchev observed: "Don't feel badly. I've got generals who can't hit anything either." Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy* (New York: Avon Books, 1966), p. 285.

⁷See Roman Kolkowicz, "The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps," *Orbis*, Summer 1967, pp. 378-393.

⁸On the Soviet scientific establishment, see Alexander Korol, *Soviet Research and Development: Its Organization, Personnel and Funds*

given to their roles in the national security policy domain. In the following discussion, I will consider these individuals not just as "experts" in the Soviet government, but more specifically as *defense intellectuals*.⁹ Broadly speaking, they fall into five categories: (1) the senior military strategists; (2) the military philosophers; (3) the military systems analysts; (4) the civilian institutional academics; and (5) the natural scientists.

THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY STRATEGISTS

These individuals comprise the clearest example of what Westerners would immediately consider to be the Soviet military intelligentsia. Although most are senior officers, their day-to-day activity has not involved the command and staff responsibilities that have traditionally been the preoccupation of military professionals. Rather, these officers have appeared more concerned with theorizing about strategy than with implementing it. Many wield impressive academic credentials. And all have had prominent military academy or staff positions.

These individuals are committed spokesmen for the military and its corporate interests. Yet they reflect a serious concern for the need to tailor Soviet defense policy to the realities of the nuclear era. In this sense, they have not so much been advocates of military programmatic interests as proponents of a balanced strategy to meet the requirements of Soviet national security. Among their central concerns have been an abiding preoccupation with maintaining a credible deterrent

(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), and R. W. Davies and R. Ammann, "Science Policy in the USSR," *Scientific American*, June 1969, pp. 19-25.

⁹Leaving aside which individuals in each category can be fairly described as "defense intellectuals," it should be stressed that not all members of these groups concern themselves primarily with policy matters. Although my analysis is concerned with military considerations in Soviet policymaking, it is not intended as a study of the role of the military in Soviet politics per se. Insofar as it addresses military participation in Soviet decisionmaking, it is only interested in those individuals expressly defined as "defense intellectuals." For a fuller discussion of Soviet military lobbying, see Roman Kolkowicz's chapter in Gordon Skilling and Franklyn J. C. Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

and a quest for greater military involvement in Soviet defense policy formulation. Their most prominent members have been major participants in the internal Party-military dialogue that has emerged since Stalin's death. There is little doubt that these figures have similarly skilled, though perhaps less visible, colleagues interspersed elsewhere throughout the Soviet defense bureaucracy.

The most prominent of these senior strategists was the late Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii. At the time of his death in May 1968, Sokolovskii was *primus inter pares* among those elders on the General Staff charged with overseeing the formulation of Soviet military doctrine, strategy, and policy. Sokolovskii gained widespread recognition as editor-in-chief of the landmark compendium *Military Strategy* (now into its third revised edition), universally acclaimed by Soviets and Westerners alike as the most comprehensive statement on Soviet military thought to have been published in over 30 years.¹⁰ As a prolific contributor to Soviet military journals, he was also a persistent, if cautious, advocate of programs to streamline the Soviet defense policy process along the lines of the American model. Among other things, Sokolovskii proposed the establishment of a joint Soviet political-military planning group similar to the U.S. National Security Council and the development of Soviet military "think tanks" like RAND.¹¹

Another notable representative of the military intellectual community was the late Major General Nikolai Talenskii. Although an outspoken defender of military expertise since the first days of doctrinal ferment following the death of Stalin,¹² Talenskii came to be

¹⁰There are two versions of this compendium in English. The more useful is the RAND translation, with annotations and an analytical introduction by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Goure, and Thomas W. Wolfe, published under the title *Soviet Military Strategy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

¹¹Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii and Major General M. Cherednichenko, "On Contemporary Military Strategy," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil*, April 1966, pp. 59-66.

¹²In late 1953, Talenskii authored a significant article in a restricted-circulation publication of the General Staff which most analysts now agree constituted the opening round of the post-Stalin military debate. Talenskii's purpose was to establish a case for increased military participation in Soviet defense policy formulation.

widely known as one of the most perceptive Soviet observers of the constraints which nuclear weapons had imposed on the usefulness of military power. At a time when many of his colleagues were still extolling the merits of a preemptive strategy, Talenskii was nurturing some very different views on the matter. "In our time," he wrote in 1965, "there is no more dangerous an illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is possible to achieve political aims through the use of nuclear weapons and at the same time survive, and that it is possible to find 'acceptable' forms of nuclear war."¹³

As insistent as he was on the importance of deterring nuclear war, Talenskii seemed uncomfortable with the tenuous assumption of adversary rationality upon which the concept of deterrence hinged. In a significant article which argued that Soviet security would be better served by military self-sufficiency than by reliance on the "good intentions" of the American enemy, he laid out a reasoned case for ballistic missile defense as a hedge against deterrence failure. In its broad essentials, this argument remains the official Soviet position on the ABM issue today.¹⁴

There have been major disagreements among these strategists on the key themes that should dominate Soviet operational doctrine. Inevitably, these disagreements have spilled over into the realm of resource priorities. Although some writers, like Talenskii, have shown a dominant interest in more abstract problems of deterrence theory, others have been directly involved in the day-to-day management of the defense establishment. On the one hand, there have been modernists like

See "On the Question of the Character of the Laws of Military Science," *Voennaia mysl*, September 1953, pp. 20-39. For an analysis of this and related articles, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 66-69 and Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 37-63.

¹³Major General N. Talenskii, "Reflecting on the Last War," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, May 1965, p. 23.

¹⁴Major General N. Talenskii, "Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, October 1964, pp. 15-19.

Colonel General Lomov, a former Khrushchev loyalist and now senior professor at the General Staff Academy, who have stressed the importance of nuclear missiles in the Soviet strategic schema.¹⁵ In contrast, there have been more traditional figures like Marshal Rotmistrov, who, while recognizing the need for these new weapons, have emphasized the continued requirement for large armies and conventional capabilities.¹⁶ Between these extremes has been a large body of centrist opinion, best epitomized by Marshal Solokovskii and his book *Military Strategy*, which argued for balanced forces to meet a wide variety of contingencies.

Yet despite their disagreements, the senior strategists have retained greater similarities than differences. They have all been respected members of the Soviet military community; they have been largely concerned with conceptualization rather than with administrative and command functions; they have been strategically situated at the upper echelons of the Soviet military hierarchy, both in the General Staff and in the academies; and, despite their uniformed status, they have focused on problems of Soviet defense as a whole rather than on the more parochial interests of the individual services.

¹⁵See, for example, Colonel General N. Lomov, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil*, May 1962, pp. 11-21. The views expressed by Lomov in this article were subsequently expanded in a short brochure entitled *Sovetskaia Voennaia Doktrina* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963). For further discussion, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *Comments on Lomov's "Soviet Military Doctrine"* (The RAND Corporation, P-2816, October 1963).

¹⁶Rotmistrov went to great lengths to point out that the primacy assigned to strategic missiles might produce a dangerous new orthodoxy which could cripple the further "creative development" of Soviet military theory. In a typical argument, he asserted: "In defining the roles [of military forces] in warfare, calculations based on the anticipated results of using a single new type of weapon can lead to erroneous conclusions.... As the history of war teaches, new forms of warfare replace the old not at one stroke, but gradually, since the new cannot manage without the old for a long time. This situation also pertains to the development of armaments and military technology." Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov, "Military Science and the Academies," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 26, 1964. For discussion, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *Some Recent Signs of Reaction Against the Prevailing Soviet Doctrinal Emphasis on Missiles* (The RAND Corporation, P-2929, June 1964).

THE MILITARY PHILOSOPHERS

Unlike the senior military figures discussed above, Moscow's closest approximation to our defense hardliners are, almost to a man, obscure colonels largely unknown in the West outside a narrow circle of specialists in Soviet military affairs. These "Red hawks," as Roman Kolkowicz has called them, are vocal militants whose main goal seems to have been advocacy.¹⁷ They might not warrant treatment as defense intellectuals at all were it not for their prominence in the recent Soviet strategic debate. They are all faculty members at various military academies and schools. Most hold advanced degrees in economics, military science, or history. And they have virtually dominated the pages of the Soviet military press over the past decade.

Although there is no evidence that would suggest active connivance among these colonels, their writings on strategy have been so uniformly consistent that it is tempting to view them as members of a significant institutional subgroup within the military. Among their more outspoken views have been arguments in support of the possibility of achieving meaningful victory in nuclear war; assertions claiming the inadequacy of deterrence-only policies and the need for maintaining sufficient forces to fight a nuclear war; vigorous support of efforts to achieve and maintain Soviet military superiority over the United States; a rejection of the desirability of East-West arms control agreements; and advocacy of continued growth in Soviet heavy industry and strategic offensive and defensive arms deployment.

These arguments deserve our attention because of the unusual manner in which they have been articulated. One can easily find comparable statements in the writings of more senior officers, up to and including the Minister of Defense. Yet unlike these latter exhortations, which have borne all the earmarks of self-interested military claims on the Soviet pocketbook, the contributions of the "Red hawks" have been more thoroughly reasoned and have sought to build an intellectual foundation for those claims.

¹⁷See Roman Kolkowicz, *The "Red Hawks" on the Rationality of Nuclear War* (The RAND Corporation, RM-4899-PR, March 1966).

One of the best examples was an article written in 1965 by Lieutenant Colonel Yevgenii Rybkin called "On the Essence of a World Nuclear-Missile War."¹⁸ Rybkin's view on the "essence" of such a war was that it is anything but politically meaningless and that it is "winnable" if the necessary forces are provided. To be sure, Rybkin conceded the vast destructive potential of such a war. At the same time, he showed little faith in the stability of nuclear deterrence. "The controversies capable of leading to a nuclear war continue to exist," he wrote, "and the propensity for its eruption cannot be ruled out." Rybkin then called for a damage-limiting strategy based on superior Soviet nuclear forces:

It must be remembered that the degree of sacrifice that will inevitably be inflicted on civilization in such a war depends in many ways on the course of the armed struggle. The more decisively and quickly the aggressive actions of imperialism are stopped by our arms, the less serious will be the unfavorable consequences of the war.

Rybkin further indicated the types of forces needed to assure such damage limitation. In a clear allusion to ABM, he asserted: "There are opportunities to create and develop new means of conducting war that are capable of reliably countering an enemy's nuclear strikes." As for those who maintained that nuclear war would be mutually suicidal, Rybkin responded with contempt. In an *ad hominem* attack on General Talenskii, who had dismissed the possibility of winning a nuclear war, he voiced this admonition:

Any *a priori* rejection of the possibility of victory is harmful because it leads to moral disarmament, to a disbelief in victory, and to fatalism and passivity. It is necessary to wage a struggle against such views and attitudes.

The overriding goal of Soviet strategy, Rybkin concluded, was "to maintain the utmost vigilance of the armed forces ... and to foster the uninterrupted development of military science and technology."

¹⁸ *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil*, September 1965 pp. 50-56.

Picking up where Rybkin left off, another "Red hawk," Colonel Bondarenko, suggested that Moscow might best gain strategic superiority through technological surprise:

An important factor, especially under present conditions, is the suddenness of the appearance of one or another new type of weapon. Suddenness in this realm not only affects the morale of the adversary, but also deprives him for a long time of the possibility of applying effective defensive measures against the new weapon.¹⁹

In stressing the importance of such surprise, Bondarenko argued that "the creation of a basically new weapon, secretly nurtured in scientific offices and design collectives, can abruptly change the relationship of forces in a short time." To support his argument, he invoked the authority of a prominent aircraft designer, S. A. Lavochkin, who, he maintained, "correctly asserted that while it is necessary to improve existing designs, it is also important to deviate more boldly from existing diagrams, to combine development of old types of equipment with a truly revolutionary break from former views and notions."

Rybkin and Bondarenko are not isolated cases. Similar themes have been advanced by other military conservatives.²⁰ The interesting question is how they have managed to get away with such outspokenness. I will defer addressing this question to a later section and merely note here that the military philosophers have been vigorous advocates of a specific line. In so doing, they have shown all the characteristics of a defense intelligentsia, including academic credentials, professorial berths, and ready access to the Soviet military literature.

¹⁹Colonel V. Bondarenko, "Military-Technological Superiority: The Most Important Factor in the Reliable Defense of the Country," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil*, September 1966, pp. 7-14. For a detailed analysis of this article, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Argument for Superiority: A New Voice in the Soviet Strategic Debate* (Institute for Defense Analyses, N-419R, January 1967).

²⁰See Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Politics of the Soviet Military Under Brezhnev and Kosygin* (unpublished master's thesis, Georgetown University, May 1968).

THE MILITARY SYSTEMS ANALYSTS

Yet a third group of defense intellectuals is made up of uniformed systems analysts. This community is the closest Soviet analogue to those operations researchers who have played such a prominent role in American military planning since the McNamara revolution of the early 1960s. It is composed of military men rather than civilians, however, and seems closely tied to the General Staff, unlike McNamara's "whiz kids," who have typically been pitted in an adversary relationship with the American armed services.

In many ways, this group is one of the most difficult parts of the Soviet defense intelligentsia to examine. Its organizational boundaries and institutional roles are largely unknown. We cannot say, for example, whether it possesses bureaucratic stature in the Soviet Defense Ministry comparable to that of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis within the U.S. Defense Department. There is also little information on how extensive it is or on who its leading members are, since there have been so few writings of the "systems analysis" genre in the open literature. Nevertheless, there are enough signs that such analysis takes place within the military to indicate that it plays *some* role in Soviet defense decisionmaking.

At its core, systems analysis seeks to overcome the vagaries of intuition by applying rigorous standards of proof to complex public policy problems. It relies heavily on computer modeling to enhance the rationality of choice among competing force mixes by providing explicit cost-effectiveness comparisons. Although the extent to which the Soviets employ these techniques cannot be determined, there is little doubt that the inherent worth of the methodology has been recognized by their theoreticians. Those officers who write on such matters reflect a sophisticated grasp of Western approaches, especially those involving computer applications. The Soviets have also begun to develop a respectable body of literature of their own in the field.²¹

²¹See, for example, A. V. Venikov, "Certain Methodological Problems of Modelling," *Voprosy filosofii*, November 1964; and N. Buslenko et al., *Metod statisticheskikh ispytaniy: metod Monte-Karlo* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskoe Radio," 1962). The Monte Carlo method is a

One compendium warrants special mention because it focuses with exceptional clarity on the many dimensions of today's military decision problems. The central theme of this volume is the "all-embracing" character of scientific analysis in military affairs. To illustrate the gravity of military decisionmaking in the nuclear era, the compendium highlights the burdensome problem of deciding whether to go to war:

One of the characteristic peculiarities of the modern revolution in military affairs is that weaponry and combat equipment have become much more complicated and the amount of operational and tactical information circulating about...has increased enormously. In order to make a decision to use nuclear missile weapons, it is necessary to process an enormous volume of information and to make complex, labor-intensive calculations.²²

Because of these demands, the book adds, "military headquarters have, metaphorically speaking, become a kind of giant scientific research and computer center."

In a subsequent passage, the problem of separating crucial factors from trivial ones is underscored: "The more complex the phenomena, the more often are the instances in which one of the cause-and-effect links proves to be much more weighty than the sum of all the others." Furthermore, "with the increasing complexity of the involved variables, their linkages and relations increasingly acquire the character of many-sided interdependencies, naturally making their quantitative comparison difficult."

As one way of coping with this problem, the book suggests the theory of strategic games developed by John von Neumann. This theory,

variant of dynamic computer programming developed for military applications by the Mathematics Department of The RAND Corporation during the late 1950s.

²²Major General N. Sushko and Lieutenant Colonel T. Kondratkov, eds., *Metodologicheskie problemy voennoi teorii i praktiki* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967). This work bears some resemblance in scope to the widely accepted RAND text on systems analysis, Edward S. Quade, ed., *Analysis for Military Decisions* (Chicago: Rand-McNally and Company, 1964).

as described by its Soviet proponents, "postulates that both opponents are intelligent and cunning, that each is attempting to find the best course of conduct under any conditions, and that a blunder by one will increase the other's chance of winning."²³ Although this account does not mention the important *cooperative* element which game theory also seeks to isolate in strategic behavior, it reflects a fair understanding of the role of such theory in clarifying options under conditions of uncertainty. The authors maintain that such theory "is finding more and more widespread application in the solution of military problems."

Other techniques are also addressed, not only for evaluating strategic interaction dynamics, but also those related to sorting out resource priorities, judging the effectiveness of alternative weapons, and identifying optimum command-and-control measures. Soviet systems analysts, like their American brethren, seem well aware of the importance of cost-effectiveness in military planning and have been vigorous proponents of a "scientific" approach to decisionmaking. Their discussions of such techniques as linear and dynamic programming, military force-posture modeling, and war-gaming sound like echoes of earlier work done in the American defense community. To the extent that they have shown a broad theoretical grasp of defense planning issues and an understanding of the analytic challenges those issues present, it seems appropriate to treat the military systems analysts as a pivotal part of the Soviet defense intellectual community.

²³An often heard critique of the theories advanced by Thomas Schelling in *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) is that the "rationality of irrationality" principle, whereby one assumes an irrevocable stance in the expectation that the adversary will take the last clear chance to back down, works only if the adversary is unaware that he is being manipulated. If the Sushko-Kondratkov volume faithfully reflects Moscow's appreciation of conflict theory, it would appear that the Kremlin is well suited to playing this game also.

THE INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMICS

We now come to what, for American political scientists, is perhaps the most interesting phenomenon in the rise of the Soviet defense intelligentsia: the emergence of a group of civilians who have made international security analysis their professional livelihood. These people bring a pronounced scholarly style to their work. They have their own specialized journals, observe the procedural conventions of academic research, and display a dominant theoretical and conceptual focus on their topics of inquiry. Their work is conducted within institutions that loosely compare to our own university-affiliated centers for strategic studies. In contrast to the uniformed defense intellectuals, they are far more liberal in their political outlook and are more concerned about such matters as deterrence stability, arms control, and East-West relations.

The institutional academics fall into two broad categories: the specialists in foreign policy and international relations, and the "Americanologists." Those in the first group are mainly housed in the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, a social-science component of the Academy of Sciences under the directorship of Academician Inozemtsev. These scholars have been the main progenitors of modern Soviet international relations theory. They are closely attentive to American writings in the field, often contributing critical reviews of those writings in their own journals. They have also drawn heavily on American methodological developments in the course of their research.²⁴ One of their hallmarks has been a notably un-Marxist inclination to view countries and power clusters, rather than social classes, as the salient features of the international system and to consider inter-nation, rather than inter-class, conflict as the main

²⁴ Indeed, as one American scholar has noted, many of these Soviet analysts are now "indulging in the luxury of dispensing gratuitous advice to the 'bourgeoisie' on how to view their own interests ... much in the same way that Western scholars define the interests of the Soviet Union for the Kremlin." Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Diplomacy in the Mirror of Soviet Scholarship," in John Keep and Liliana Brisby, eds., *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 270.

essence of that system.²⁵ Another notable characteristic has been an abiding fascination with the uses of game theory in studying international behavior, along with an expressed belief that this theory has value for peace-loving forces as well as for "militarists."²⁶ Such an interest was reflected in a remark by Academician Lemin that "the use of computers, the application of game theory and the theory of probabilities, and other mathematical methods are fully expedient both in the sphere of foreign policy and in the science of international relations."²⁷

On a more practical plane, the academics have also constituted the bulk of those Soviet commentators who have come to question the political value of strategic power in an era of mutual deterrence. An example was the suggestion by the prominent historian, N. Nikol'skii, that the criteria for determining Soviet power be defined in terms of "peace potential," namely, the ability to assure deterrence rather than to successfully fight a war.²⁸ Another civilian writer, G. Gerasimov, offered a rare public rejection of the concept of strategic superiority, which has been so vocally espoused by the military hardliners:

Superiority has become a concept that has no bearing on war. No superiority can save an aggressor from retribution. Any efforts of an aggressor to achieve *relative* nuclear superiority are neutralized in advance by the fact that the

²⁵For discussion, see William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1956-1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

²⁶G. Gerasimov, "War Savants Play Games," *International Affairs* (Moscow), July 1964, p. 81. Gerasimov is the author of what appears to have been the most serious Soviet treatment of game theory applications in international relations. See "The Theory of Games and International Relations," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, July 1966, pp. 101-108.

²⁷I. Lemin, "The Great October Socialist Revolution and World Politics," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, June 1967, p. 10.

²⁸N. Nikol'skii, *Osnovnoi vopros sovremennosti* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1964), p. 269. Nikol'skii took as his point of departure Klaus Knorr's concept of "the war potential of nations." Knorr's book by that title has been translated into Russian as *Voennyi potentsial gosudarstv* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960).

other side possesses *absolute* power which guarantees the destruction of the aggressor.²⁹

Arguing that possession of an assured retaliatory capability would enable even an inferior power to deter nuclear war, Gerasimov went on to dismiss the argument for superiority as the product of a bankrupt assumption:

The need to strive for so-called superiority over a potential enemy has been regarded as an axiom. Of course, he who has more sabres has a better chance. The same is true of more tanks, aircraft, or infantry divisions. But it is not true that he who has more nuclear missiles has greater chances.... These conclusions follow logically from the recognition of the impossibility of victory in nuclear war.

By and large, the international relations theorists have been the most sophisticated Soviet commentators on the political dimensions of nuclear weapons. Their vocabulary has converged perceptibly with that of American scholars like Henry Kissinger and Thomas Schelling.³⁰ They have shown a keen awareness of the constraints which mutual deterrence has placed on the uses of force in the superpower confrontation. They have voiced substantial disagreement with their military colleagues on the nature of the American threat, arguing that a guaranteed deterrent is all the Soviets need to assure their security in the face of this threat. They have rejected categorically the idea that nuclear war has political utility.³¹ On the issue of proliferation, they have gone well

²⁹G. Gerasimov, "Pentagonia: 1966," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1966, pp. 24-30.

³⁰In fact, a number of the most prominent writings of America's academic defense specialists have been translated and made available to Soviet audiences. For a partial listing, see Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations*, pp. 55-54.

³¹Nikol'skii, for example, observed that "thermonuclear is, in its essence, no longer war but rather the self-negation of war." *Osnovnoi vopros sovremennosti*, p. 381. This assertion was criticized, along with the views of General Talenskii, in the previously-cited article by Lieutenant Colonel Rybkin, "On the Essence of a World Nuclear-Missile War." It is typical of the strategic outlook generally propounded by most Soviet institute analysts.

beyond the "official" Soviet focus on the German threat to address the challenge to international security posed by nuclear spread to the Third World.³² The need for cooperation and accommodation is a recurring theme in their analyses of the East-West confrontation. In short, they have advanced a conception of international reality expressed in the terms of a mixed-motive rather than a zero-sum game.

Another part of the Soviet academic community is specifically concerned with the United States and its institutions, policies, and politics. Although "Americanology" has hardly become an academic growth industry in the Soviet Union, its practitioners are loosely comparable to our own specialists in Soviet affairs. These analysts are still a recent phenomenon in Soviet intellectual life. As a result, there is not much we can say with assurance about them. We do know that they staff the newly established Institute of the United States, headed by a long-time observer of the American scene, Georgii Arbatov. We also know that their main interests concern the institutional dynamics of American policymaking. From the little hearsay evidence available, we can assume that at least some of them have access to the Politburo and the Central Committee. We cannot gauge the extent of this access or the degree of influence it bestows on the Americanologists.

Insofar as these scholars command the attention of the Soviet leadership, however, their presence would seem conducive to a more moderate Soviet perception of the United States. Unlike the classic Soviet view of "Wall Street" as the source of all U.S. policy, the outlook propounded by the Americanologists shows a perceptive appreciation of the many interactions that in fact dominate our political process. Brushing aside the familiar caricatures of Marxist-Leninist theory, the Americanologists point to the dominant role of institutions and interest groups in determining U.S. policies. This perspective, in turn, permits differentiation between so-called "madmen" and "sober forces" in the American government. It also enables its

³²For further discussion, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy," *Orbis*, Summer 1970, forthcoming.

proponents to argue that American political and military decisions are less "law-governed" imperatives of the bourgeois class than merely the natural consequences of secular trends in the interplay among opposed forces. In other words, it allows for the existence of responsible leaders as well as villains in the United States and strongly implies that Soviet diplomacy should be directed toward the former.³³

The Americanologists have brought a much-needed balance to the traditionally prismatic Soviet view of the United States. Their analytical tools include many of the approaches used by Western students of comparative politics. The result has been a remarkably objective comprehension (by Soviet standards) of the real problems and issues that affect American policymaking.³⁴ Arbatov himself has displayed an outlook notably unfettered by the cruder forms of ideological distortion.³⁵ To be sure, the Americanologists have hardly abandoned their belief in the dominance of "ruling-class" interests in the American defense process. But they appear to have transcended the more sinister premises of vulgar Marxism by emphasizing the many secular variables which affect that process. This combination of realism and open-mindedness has made them something of a rarity in the Soviet intellectual community, for it presents an unprecedented reservoir of common sense regarding the Kremlin's major adversary. Insofar as the Americanologists have access to those who matter in the Soviet Union,

³³For additional discussion, see William Zimmerman, "Soviet Perceptions of the United States," in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 163-179.

³⁴The inaugural issue of the institute's new journal contains articles on American management techniques, the U.S. supersonic transport and its politics, the recently concluded Pugwash disarmament conference of American and Soviet scientists, and the political role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has also begun serialization of Theodore White's *The Making of a President: 1968* (New York: Atheneum, 1969). See *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, January 1970. For a discussion of this journal and of the USA Institute, see also Bernard Gwertzman, "Soviet Starts a Research Journal Devoted Entirely to the U.S.," *New York Times*, February 1, 1970.

³⁵This judgment reflects a personal impression gained during an hour-long seminar with Arbatov which I attended at the Institute for Defense Analyses in 1968.

their input can only help to ameliorate mutual East-West misperceptions and reduce the distortions in Moscow's image of the Western threat.

THE NATURAL SCIENTISTS

A final category of Soviet defense intellectuals embraces the leading physicists and engineers associated with weapons development and the military industry. These are the people who made Moscow's nuclear weapons and missile programs possible. They are also the ones upon whom the Soviet Union's continued force enhancements will largely depend. They include both uniformed scientists, about whom we know little, and civilian scientists, who have been studied extensively in their "scientific" capacity yet who remain largely unexamined in their role as defense experts.

The uniformed scientists might be compared, at least in their institutional roles, to such American officers as General Bernard Schriever, who directed the first U.S. ICBM development program, and Admiral Hyman Rickover, the patriarch of our nuclear submarine program. Their most prominent representative is Major General G. I. Pokrovskii, a nuclear physicist and senior professor at the Zhukovskii Military Aviation Engineering Institute. Pokrovskii has been a prolific writer on space flight and atomic energy applications.³⁶ He was also the first to provide a public Soviet elaboration of the feasibility of ballistic missile defense. His book *Science and Technology in Contemporary War*, published in 1956, was a landmark contribution to Soviet thinking on the military impact of missiles and nuclear weapons. Although now dated, it remains unmatched in its breadth of coverage and technical detail.³⁷

Pokrovskii played a prominent part in the development of Soviet long-range missiles and was personally credited with a major role in the design of the first artificial satellite. Along with other less visible military scientists, he represents the sort of skill reservoir that assures continued Soviet military-technological innovation. As weapons

³⁶See Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 136.

³⁷Major General G. I. Pokrovskii, *Science and Technology in Contemporary War* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959).

experts *non pareil*, these military scientists are undoubtedly consulted by the General Staff and the civilian leadership in the formulation of Soviet force modernization and arms control policies.

The civilian scientists, by contrast, represent a different case. Their skills are perhaps even more indispensable for the Soviet weapons program than those of the military scientists, for they have provided the theoretical foundations without which no innovations could be even contemplated, let alone translated into hardware. Yet unlike their uniformed counterparts, who have largely been servants of the military's parochial interests, the civilian scientists have shown liberal leanings akin to those of many leading Western scientists. This has naturally made them reluctant allies of the Soviet military-industrial complex.³⁸ No doubt the Soviets have their counterparts to American scientists like Edward Teller, the principal developer of the hydrogen bomb. Their most prominent scientists, however, have verged more closely toward Americans like Robert Oppenheimer, Hans Bethe, and Bernard Feld, men with a brilliant command of theoretical physics, yet with a moral outlook that has tended to circumscribe their willingness to underwrite what they would regard as the prostitution of their skills in the service of destruction.

As these scientists have responded to the demands of Soviet force modernization, they have also been remarkably unambiguous about their principled opposition to such work.³⁹ The father of Soviet nuclear

³⁸A strong argument can be made that military and industrial institutions in the Soviet Union share a multitude of common interests and goals, among them the maintenance of a high level of international tension. For discussion, see Richard Armstrong, "Military-Industrial Complex--Russian Style," *Fortune*, August 1969, pp. 84-87. See also Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), particularly pp. 256-277.

³⁹It is a gross exaggeration to conclude from this, however, as Albert Parry has done, that the Soviet scientific establishment has become so estranged from the Party as to constitute a cohesive and politically significant "opposition group." As beset as the Party may have become in recent years by the mounting demands of various interest groups, it has scarcely been obliged to relinquish its political dominance over them in the process. See Albert Parry, *The New Class*

physics, Petr Kapitsa, once yielded to house arrest and deprivation of laboratory facilities rather than work on atomic weapons under Stalin. One of his leading proteges, Andrei Sakharov, has recently gained widespread recognition in the West for having circulated an underground tract condemning both arms races and the policy predilections that inspire them.⁴⁰ Sakharov was a major figure in the development of the Soviet H-bomb during the early 1950s and remains today both a valued nuclear weapons specialist and a distinguished member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Because of his unusual stature, his views on Soviet force development carry great weight and deserve special consideration.

At the height of the initial arms control discussions in 1968, when some Westerners were urging a moratorium on further weapons deployments even as many military figures, Soviet and American alike, were advocating accelerated development of anti-ballistic missiles, Sakharov cast his lot firmly on the side of restraint in one of the most open arguments for arms limitation ever to have appeared in the Soviet Union. Following a detailed survey of the various penetration techniques which offensive systems use to overcome ABM defenses, Sakharov proclaimed the "practical impossibility of preventing a massive rocket attack" and added that "in a thermonuclear war, the first blow may be the decisive one and render null and void years of work and billions spent on the creation of an anti-missile defense."⁴¹ The reason, he maintained, was the technological equivalency of the two superpowers and the ability it

Divided: Science and Technology vs. Communism (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

⁴⁰The "underground press," or *samizdat* as it is called in Russian, is an *ad hoc* means of communication among Soviet scientists, writers, and intellectuals through which documents lacking official approval are circulated. It is through this network that such controversial writings as Solzhenytsin's *The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward*, both of which have been denied publication by the Party, have made the rounds under the table in the Soviet Union.

⁴¹The Sakharov manifesto has been published in English under the title *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, with an introduction and commentary by Harrison E. Salisbury (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1968).

conferred upon each to maintain a reliable deterrent regardless of any innovations by the other:

Fortunately for the stability of the world, the difference between the technical-economic potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States is not so great that one of the sides could undertake a "preventive" aggression without the almost inevitable risk of a destructive retaliatory blow. This situation would not be changed by a broadening of the arms race through the development of anti-missile defenses.

Sakharov then outlined this argument for deterrence stability through arms control:

In the opinion of many people, an opinion shared by this author, a diplomatic formulation of this mutually comprehended situation, for example, in the form of a moratorium on the construction of anti-missile systems, would be a useful demonstration of a desire by the Soviet Union and the United States to preserve the status quo and not to widen the arms race for senselessly expensive anti-missile systems. It would be a demonstration of a desire to cooperate, not to fight.

Elsewhere in his manifesto, Sakharov voiced concern over Stalinist tendencies in the Soviet Union and their constraining effect on intellectual creativity. His outspokenness, which took him so far as to espouse a multiparty system in the Soviet Union, would most likely have provoked a severe penalty had it been expressed by a writer of lesser stature. To our best knowledge, however, Sakharov has gone unscathed by the authorities, no doubt a happy consequence of his public prominence and indispensability as a leading scientist.

The strategic views espoused by Sakharov, views he maintains are widely shared throughout the Soviet scientific community, are important not because of their content per se but because of the unusual authoritativeness that attaches to them owing to the special credibility of their proponent. The intimate knowledge of weapons technology possessed by scientists like Sakharov obliges political decisionmakers to listen carefully to these experts. In common with the other defense

intellectuals examined above, their views on strategy are not merely political opinions but professional judgments.

To emphasize again, these defense analysts disagree widely among themselves, and they are not uniformly located at pivotal points in the Soviet hierarchy. But they surely command the attention of the national security bureaucracy. How that attention is allocated by the leadership and how it affects Soviet defense policy are questions to which we may now turn.

III. THE DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS IN SOVIET POLITICS

The Soviet system has grown increasingly beset by a conflict between the Party's desire to retain hegemonial dominance over all other societal institutions and its equally compelling need to engage the help of experts in the policy process. The issues that dominate this process have reached such a level of complexity that the Party no longer has it within its competence to manage things alone. Nowhere has this become more apparent than in the realm of military affairs. In earlier times, the Party could assert its authority merely by political decree:

The policy of the military department, like the policies of all the other departments and establishments, is carried out on the precise basis of general directives issued by the Party through its Central Committee and under its direct control.¹

More recently, however, the rise of specialized skill groups and the development of more exacting standards within the Soviet defense establishment have prompted a mounting need for expert counsel in military policy formulation. The once-monolithic Party has thus been forced to play a synthesizing role, striving to reconcile these new demands while retaining its own political supremacy in the process. Its challenge has been to find a way of engaging the professionals in the policy process without having to parcel out its own jealously guarded authority.

In seeking to understand how the defense intellectuals have made their presence felt, it is important to note first some basic rules of group politics in the Soviet Union. To begin with, even the most well-positioned specialists, such as the senior military strategists, exert their influence largely by indirection. The Soviet polity is a closed

¹From an official Party decree promulgated in 1918, cited in Colonel I. Prusanov, "The Increased Organizational and Directive Influence of the Party in the Armed Forces: 1956-1964," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, February 1965, pp. 3-14.

system in which the main deal-cutting goes on within the inner sanctums of the Politburo and Secretariat. As one American writer has put it, "the important decisions are still initiated at the top, by the Party leadership, rather than from below, by the organized pressure of interest groups and experts."² Outside specialists may assert their views, be directly consulted, and even help shape policy through the weight of their counsel. But they do not make decisions themselves.

Even in the United States, where our open political system allows academic "in-and-outers"³ to pervade the halls of government, defense intellectuals rarely participate directly in decisionmaking. With the exception of high-level advisers like Henry Kissinger, they do not even routinely command immediate access to the key decisionmakers. In the Soviet Union, this separation between the defense intellectuals and the leadership is even more pronounced. So when we speak of the political role of Moscow's defense experts, we are talking about influence and persuasiveness rather than about the formal exercise of political power.

Second, considerable role differentiation exists among the Soviet defense intellectuals. Some are more important than others; some have greater responsibilities and more immediate policy concerns than others; some have shorter channels of communication to the top leadership than others; and, within each group, some individuals figure more centrally than others. Because of this, we cannot talk very usefully about the influence of the defense specialists in aggregate terms. Rather, we must treat each group (and each individual within it) on a case-by-case basis. Although the defense intellectuals play an important role in the policy arena, they also exist at the tolerance of the leadership and vary in their influence in direct proportion to the extent to which their skills are needed by the leadership. Many of the views put forward by the defense intellectuals have merely been gratuitous advice

²Henry W. Morton, "The Structure of Decisionmaking in the USSR: A Comparative Introduction," in Peter H. Juviler and Henry H. Morton, *Soviet Policymaking* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 12.

³The expression is Stanley Hoffmann's. *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 243.

which the Party has ignored. In some instances, however, their inputs have been sufficiently persuasive, or directed at sufficiently urgent issues, that the Party has been forced to pay attention. In a few cases, such as the recent formation of a negotiating team for the upcoming strategic arms limitation talks, the defense intellectuals have been expressly included in the policy community. The important point is that there are no hard and fast rules to be drawn.

Finally, the secrecy that shrouds Soviet military affairs severely hinders our ability to assess the extent of influence wielded by those defense intellectuals who, by all indications, *have* been engaged by the leadership. In such cases in which the arguments espoused by various defense experts have subsequently turned up in the official pronouncements of the leadership, or have otherwise been reflected in Soviet behavior, there is a natural temptation to conclude that the defense intellectuals must have had a hand in shaping the concerned event. Yet to do so without corroborating evidence would ignore the alternate possibility that other unseen but equally influential groups within the hierarchy brought the deciding pressure to bear or that the Party elite framed their choice independently, for reasons unrelated to what may have been merely a random coincidence of outside counsel in support of that choice.

Despite these constraints, we can venture some reasoned hypotheses about the political role of the Soviet defense intellectuals. Granted, the available information is spotty and must be approached cautiously. It cannot, for example, support hard answers as to how and to what degree the defense intellectuals have influenced the beliefs and policies of the political leadership. Nor can it take us very far toward addressing even the more modest question of whether the defense intellectuals have consistently exerted any significant influence at all. On the other hand, it has much to contribute to a more aggregated understanding of Soviet defense decisionmaking. It suggests that the defense intellectuals indeed constitute a distinct phenomenon in Soviet politics; that they participate in a continuing dialogue with the Party leaders; and that, on occasion, they succeed in attracting the attention of those in the hierarchy whose views they would seek to influence.

In the preceding discussion, I characterized Moscow's defense intellectuals in terms of their respective interests and analytical styles. Here, it may help to redefine them in terms of their institutional affiliations and political functions. As we have seen above, the senior strategists, the "Red hawks," and the military systems analysts all serve in one fashion or another as *amici curiae* of the military establishment. The institutional academics and the natural scientists, by contrast, appear to serve as something of a loyal opposition. They tend to espouse views at substantial variance with those of their uniformed counterparts. Put differently, the military specialists constitute a reservoir of analytical talent for the military-industrial complex and largely reflect its objectives and biases. The civilian experts comprise a more detente-oriented group associated with the emerging Soviet arms control establishment. What we must now consider is how each group has figured in the larger setting of Soviet national security decisionmaking.⁴

THE MILITARY INTELLECTUAL LOBBY

The first point to be made about the uniformed defense analysts is that they have enjoyed the strong backing of their superiors in the Defense Ministry. One of the best testaments to this was reflected in an article by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Matvei Zakharov, which appeared shortly after Khrushchev's dismissal. This article went to unusual lengths in extolling the importance of military expertise.⁵ In an unmistakable attack on Khrushchev's monopolization of the defense

⁴Any effort to force such coalitions as those outlined here into neatly defined categories is an undertaking bound to attract criticism. A common pitfall of social science modelling is its propensity to create institutional actors merely by asserting their existence. The results are often redolent of intellectual contrivance. In light of this, I should make it clear in advance that my use of the terms "military-intellectual lobby" and "arms control establishment" is intended to be interpreted loosely. Undoubtedly a close examination of the statements made by various members of these groups would reveal significant internal disagreements. To concede this, however, is not to deny that the distinctions remain analytically useful.

⁵Marshal M. V. Zakharov, "The Imperative Demand of Our Time," *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 4, 1965.

policy process, Zakharov levelled a caustic broadside against the "so-called strategic farsightedness" of "persons who lack even a remote relationship to military strategy." He then asserted:

With the emergence of nuclear-missile weaponry, cybernetics, electronics, and computer equipment, any subjective approach to military problems, hare-brained plans, and superficiality can be costly and can cause irreparable damage.

Zakharov went on to invoke an example from the Stalinist period to underscore the dangers for any political leader who would ignore the advice of the High Command's experts:

I think it may be useful to recall...how things stood regarding the development of the armored troops. Soviet military theoreticians and practitioners had convincingly proved that the creation of mechanized units having great mobility and well-equipped armored troops was an urgent necessity, fully corresponding to the demands and character of an armed struggle under the conditions of the emerging war. *This conclusion, this recommendation was crudely disregarded, however....* The majority of the mechanized corps were not fully equipped. Such subjective solutions were one of the serious reasons why the material, moral, and military possibilities available to the Soviet state at the beginning of the war were not properly exploited.

Citing a "broad military and technical scope of view" as a *sine qua non* for the "leaders to avoid subjectivism, premature and hasty decisions," Zakharov then highlighted the "important role of Soviet military science" in "the working out of authoritative and well-founded recommendations for practical activities." He concluded with this admonition:

We take legitimate pride in the truly progressive and creative Soviet military theory and in the objective, profoundly scientific and truthful Soviet military historical science, and it is the sacred duty of military cadres to protect these sciences from everything that detracts from their authority and hampers them from fruitfully developing and increasing their role in our common struggle for the strengthening of the combat readiness of the armed forces.

That leader who considers that his main science is the experience which he acquired during the last war, or simply his native intuition, is committing a gross error.

Seemingly emboldened by Zakharov's initiative,⁶ the "Red hawks" launched a sustained effort beginning in early 1965 and continuing for the better part of two years to argue for expanding and diversifying the Soviet strategic arsenal. They also called for a toughening of Soviet policy toward the United States. This effort prompted a mixed response from the political leadership. The more assertive advocates of this line clearly overstepped the bounds of acceptable criticism, for some of their statements received a sharp rebuke not only from the Party but from political officers within the military. Two of the more militant writers, Lieutenant Colonel Rybkin and Colonel Grudinin,⁷ were upbraided by name for their "independent" and "often incorrect" views. This rejoinder, which appeared in an unsigned *Krasnaia zvezda* editorial, maintained that their "one-sided explanation of the formula that war is a continuation of politics through the use of force...should not be regarded as the last word, so to speak, in the domain of theory."⁸

⁶For that matter, Zakharov himself may have been emboldened by the Party leadership. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, he had been fired as Chief of the General Staff and replaced by a Khrushchev loyalist, Marshal Biriuzov. Shortly after Khrushchev's deposition, Biriuzov was killed in a plane crash and the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime immediately moved to reinstate Zakharov. Insofar as military policy issues figured in Khrushchev's downfall, one may speculate that Zakharov's assertiveness reflected a partial mandate extended to him by the new leadership to set forth the military's grievances. For a discussion of the probable reasons for Zakharov's dismissal by Khrushchev and the possible considerations that may have underlay the decision by the new leadership to return him to duty, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *A Note on the Naming of a Successor to Marshal Biriuzov* (The RAND Corporation, P-3025, December 1964).

⁷Grudinin, a doctor of philosophical sciences, had written a critique of Rybkin's thesis which, if anything, advanced an even more militant argument than Rybkin's. See Colonel I. Grudinin, "On the Question of the Essence of War: The Merits and Shortcomings of a Certain Lecture," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 21, 1966.

⁸"On the Essence of War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 24, 1967. This article was the first volley in a Party crackdown on the military outspokenness that had run rampant throughout during the preceding two years since Khrushchev's ouster. For discussion, see Roman Kolkowicz,

More generally, the whole thrust of criticism voiced by the "Red hawks" was attacked by the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the armed forces, General Epishev, in a speech to the 23rd Party Congress.⁹ Epishev's criticism was so sharp that it warrants quotation at length:

The Party has never concealed the fact that our road toward the victory of socialism was not strewn with roses. There have been rifts and difficult passes on this road. And the Party has properly assessed them at the proper time. We have never opposed criticism of our shortcomings, but we were and still are of the opinion that criticism must be Party-minded and objective, that it must be beneficial to the common cause and not detrimental to it. And when individually damaging creations emerge which are distorting our reality, this of course can only cause justified indignation among Soviet people both at the authors and at those people who, willingly or unwillingly, because of their lack of principles, afford every opportunity for the publication of those works.

The authors Epishev had in mind may have been those of Rybkin's persuasion who had questioned the Party's policy of detente by stressing the winnability of nuclear war. For he went on to say:

The interests of protecting the socialist fatherland...oblige us also to intensify the scientific and theoretical analysis of the problem of war and peace as connected with past wars, and particularly with the nature of a thermonuclear war. This is all the more important because...under the banner of an "innovator's approach"...sometimes incorrect, confused opinions still prevail in this field and extremes are permitted in the interpretation of the possible consequences of the uses of new means of armed struggle.

This public censure, however, while clearly rejecting the views of the "Red hawks," was not followed by any silencing of those writers.

The Dilemma of Superpower: Soviet Policy and Strategy in Transition (Institute for Defense Analyses, P-383, October 1967).

⁹"Speech by Army General A. A. Epishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, at the 23rd CPSU Congress," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 5, 1966.

Indeed, Rybkin and a few of his colleagues emerged two years later as vocal critics of the Soviet Union's decision to participate in strategic arms talks with the United States. Although many senior Soviet military figures have expressed doubts about the feasibility of a nuclear arms standdown with the West,¹⁰ it has mainly been the "Red hawks" who have carried the burden of the argument.¹¹

This seems at once to confirm a point and to suggest a hypothesis. The point, as Thomas Wolfe has written, is that "the airing of divergent opinions in the Soviet Union in the past few years does not necessarily imply, as it once did, that those who lose the argument must also lose their positions of authority. Policy differences, in short, are not inextricably bound up with a power struggle. There is now somewhat more latitude than formerly for both public and private expression of differences of view.... The amount of latitude fluctuates, and there is still a fairly elaborate ritual for conveying criticism by indirection so that the myth of communist solidarity may be preserved.

Nevertheless, the conditions of Soviet discourse today do allow more room for airing of differences than before."¹²

The hypothesis is that the "Red hawks" have enjoyed a privileged status within the military which has protected them from career-killing bureaucratic reprisals for their outspokenness. Even in the West, colonels do not take public issue with their superiors on policy matters. Why should they do so in the Soviet Union, where the regime demands total conformity to the Party line, where expressions of dissent

¹⁰For a brief synopsis, see Matthew P. Gallagher, "Red Army's Arms Lobby," *Washington Post*, February 9, 1969.

¹¹Rybkin, in particular, offered a decidedly jaundiced view of the emerging Soviet line on arms control: "We cannot agree," he wrote, "with the view that disarmament can be achieved as a result of peaceful negotiations of this acute and complex problem by the representatives of opposing social systems.... Under contemporary conditions, the primary task of the socialist countries is the strengthening of their armed forces, increasing their capabilities and their readiness." "A Critique of Bourgeois Concepts of War and Peace," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil*, September 1968, p. 90.

¹²Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 26-27.

are typically proscribed, and where measures against public criticism can be severe?

There are, of course, no easy answers to this question. A plausible argument, however, is that the relatively low-ranking "Red hawks" may have been encouraged and protected by higher-level officers whose own endorsement of a tougher line might be deemed impolitic or even dangerous.¹³ Such an argument could explain why the "Red hawks" have been able to sustain their outspokenness in the face of manifest political disavowal of their views. Seen from this perspective, the "Red hawks" may be floating trial balloons for their more senior sponsors while enjoying the institutional protection that stems from the military's way of "taking care of its own."¹⁴ Whatever the case, the "Red hawks" are playing a highly visible role in the Soviet defense debate. Although their views have been accepted less than warmly by the political elite, they have at least been given a prominent public airing. To this extent, the "Red hawks" constitute important players in the military's interest articulation process.

The military system analysts, on the other hand, have struck a more responsive chord among the post-Khrushchev political leadership. Their advocacy of computerized techniques for defense planning, for example, and their recognition of the limited relevance of traditional generalship in the modern world have dovetailed nicely with the "scientific" and "businesslike" style which the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has repeatedly ascribed to itself since Khrushchev's ouster in the fall

¹³John Erickson, a British student of Soviet military affairs who has interviewed some of the top figures on the General Staff, is said to have expressed the belief that a number of patron-protege relationships exist within the Soviet High Command and that many generals have "their" colonels, who act as point men in the internal strategic dialogue.

¹⁴This practice of "covering up" is known to be endemic in the Soviet military and has occasionally been a subject of pointed criticism by political cadres. The military's top political officer, General Epishev, once bluntly lashed out at what he termed "mutual backscratching" and called for an "intensification of Party influence on all aspects of the life and activity of the military in order to put a stop to it." General A. A. Epishev, "The Need for Increasing the Activity and Combat Readiness of Party Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy," *Krasnaia zvezda*, December 23, 1966.

of 1964.¹⁵ Beyond this, a case can be made that Party-military contention over the proper approach to military planning figured centrally in the debate over the choice of a new Defense Minister which briefly ensued following the death of Marshal Malinovskii in March 1967. The evidence bearing on this case, as one might expect, is largely circumstantial. Nonetheless, the Malinovskii succession was an important crucible of post-Khrushchev Party-military politics and warrants a closer look.

Immediately after Malinovskii's death, there developed a flurry of rumors in Moscow that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was seeking to install a civilian, Dmitri Ustinov, to head the Defense Ministry.¹⁶ There is no way of determining the source or validity of those rumors, but certain events in the immediate weeks after Malinovskii's demise tended to suggest that they were not entirely without foundation. To begin with, the rumors were never denied (or even openly recognized) in the Soviet press. By itself, this would indicate little, since various contestants for influence in the Soviet elite have long resorted to contrived innuendo of this sort as a means for bolstering their domestic and foreign policy positions.¹⁷ This rumor, however, took on added substance by the related fact that a two-week period elapsed between

¹⁵For three early examples of this emergent Soviet exhortation on behalf of policy "rationalism," see F. Burlatskii, "Politics and Science," *Pravda*, January 10, 1965; "Lenin's Ideas on the Scientific Guidance of the Construction of Communism," *Pravda*, April 29, 1965; and P. Fedoseyev, "Materialism--the Enemy of Subjectivism," *Izvestiia*, May 13, 1965.

¹⁶One of the first reports of this rumor was carried by Reuters. See "Civilian is Rumored for Soviet Defense Minister," *The Washington Post*, April 5, 1967.

¹⁷An example may have been the July 1968 leak by "usually well-informed foreign communist sources in Moscow" that Communist China had developed an intercontinental ballistic missile. See "Communist Sources Say China Has First ICBM," *Washington Post*, July 1, 1968. This report coincided with the official announcement of Soviet interest in strategic arms limitation talks with the United States. It was never publically corroborated by Western intelligence. In the intervening period, the Chinese missile program has, if anything, undergone a significant slowdown. There is still no evidence to indicate that China has acquired a usable ICBM. Consequently, there is every reason to suspect that this "leak" was in fact engineered in Moscow to lend an air of added urgency to the Soviet arms control proposal.

Malinovskii's death and the announcement of a successor. Ordinarily, one would think that the Politburo would have had in hand a ready replacement for such an important position, all the more so in this instance, in which the death of the long-ailing Malinovskii could hardly have been unexpected by anyone in the top leadership.

Finally, the appointment of a new Defense Minister only followed a rare *in camera* convocation of the entire upper echelon of the Party and military elite.¹⁸ Taken together, this confluence of circumstances suggests that the replacement of Malinovskii was far more than a matter of simple administrative procedure and that if the Party did have an available candidate, his investiture remained contingent on a good deal of political bargaining with the military.

Ultimately, it was announced that Malinovskii's successor would be Marshal Andrei Grechko, formerly First Deputy Minister and Supreme Commander of the Warsaw Pact. Once this occurred, the rumors regarding the possibility of a civilian appointee abated as quickly as they had arisen. Nevertheless, the case remains interesting for the light it may shed on Party attitudes toward the "systems approach" to defense planning. The rumored candidate, Ustinov, was important not so much because he was civilian per se as because of the special credentials he bore. A management specialist by training and a career administrator in the defense industry, Ustinov had been tapped earlier by Khrushchev to be the overseer of Soviet weapons production. He enjoyed widespread repute as a forceful innovator in the realm of weapons procurement policy. As the Western press abundantly noted at the time, Ustinov was also the closest Soviet approximation to what might be called the "McNamara phenomenon."¹⁹ Had he become Defense Minister, there is good

¹⁸Outside of a brief radio announcement, the only other public reference to this convocation appeared in a brief unsigned editorial, "The Exalted Mission of the Army of October," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 6, 1967. To my best knowledge, the last comparable Party-military summit was the October 1957 Plenum of the Central Committee, at which Marshal Zhukov was stripped of his post as Defense Minister.

¹⁹See, for example, "No McNamarsky Yet," *The Economist*, April 8, 1967, p. 123, and Stephen Rosenfeld, "Kremlin Looking for a McNamara to Rule its Brass," *The Washington Post*, April 23, 1967.

reason to believe that Soviet defense planning would have taken a dramatic turn toward greater emphasis on cost-effectiveness and decision rationality, much like that currently reflected in the McNamara Pentagon.²⁰

Insofar as there is any merit to these assumptions, two possibilities suggest themselves. One is that the appointment of Grechko, presumably over the opposition of some in the Party, attested to the continued weight of military influence in the halls of Soviet decisionmaking. The other possibility, not necessarily inconsistent with the first, is that the elevation of Ustinov to candidacy for Defense Minister, if indeed he was so promoted by the leadership, suggests the sympathy with which at least some in the Party view the "cost-benefit" approach to defense planning exemplified by the military systems analysts.²¹

The role of the leading scientists and engineers within the defense community can perhaps best be captured by a quick look at the makeup of the Soviet delegation that participated in the recently concluded preliminary strategic arms talks in Helsinki. Unlike past Soviet disarmament delegations, which generally have consisted of propagandists from the Foreign Ministry, this group was heavily laden with members of the military-scientific establishment.²² These individuals have hitherto been unknown to Western analysts. Yet there is little doubt that they embody talents and outlooks much like those of General Pokrovskii and his colleagues.

²⁰There is also the possibility that by having a representative from its own ranks sitting at the top of the military hierarchy, the Party could exercise closer political control over the armed forces.

²¹Pursuing this logic one step further, the rejection of Ustinov need not have implied military disavowal of the "systems" approach per se. It may simply have reflected an understandable desire to have a military professional at the helm of the Defense Ministry. Insofar as the post has customarily been occupied by a military man, Ustinov's appointment would have been a tradition-breaking precedent that could hardly have set well with the marshals.

²²See Bernard Gwertzman, "Arms Delegates Listed by Soviet," *New York Times*, November 12, 1969.

The most notable among these delegates, Academician Aleksander Shchukin, holds the rank of Major General of Engineering and is said to be a leading expert in radar and missile guidance. He and Petr Pleshakov, the Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry and likewise a radar specialist, constitute the core of scientific expertise on the Soviet arms control team. Since the formal arms negotiations have yet to begin and the preliminary discussions have remained heavily guarded, it would be hard at this point to say much about what the participation of these individuals presages for the manner in which technical considerations will figure in the talks.

One gathers the impression, at least thus far, however, that the Soviet team has been held on a short leash and denied much independent maneuvering room. This suggests that whatever influence over Soviet arms control policy the scientists may have enjoyed to date remains clearly subordinate and advisory in nature. There is no reason to believe that these technicians will constitute anything more than consultants on decisions that will ultimately be made by the Party elite for their own reasons. Nevertheless, their presence on the Soviet team is a significant departure from past practice which suggests that the Party is both aware of the complexities of this particular arms control challenge and needs all the expert advice it can get.

In all, the evidence pertaining to the role of the military intellectual lobby in Soviet politics leaves us with a very incomplete picture. The best we can say is that these people have a voice in Soviet strategic deliberations. One need not apologize for our inability to add much more, since pervasive Soviet secrecy and societal closure have hindered our assessments of even the most prominent Soviet political figures. On the other hand, merely having identified and demonstrated the involvement of these intellectuals is a step forward in our understanding of the Soviet national security process. If nothing else, it permits a distinction among categories of military interest articulation and levels of analysis in military policy formulation. It also helps accentuate the increasing inappropriateness of simplistic images of the "military factor" in Soviet politics.

THE ARMS CONTROL ESTABLISHMENT

The sources and processes of Soviet arms control planning are among the most obscure yet important aspects of Soviet politics as they affect Western security. The few analysts in the West who have paid serious attention to this subject have been divided in their assessments of Soviet organization and motivations for arms control. There is little evidence to confirm the existence either of any Soviet governmental source of arms control analysis such as our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or of any community of arms control experts such as one finds in American university centers and research institutions. In this regard, one American observer recently reported that a Soviet official who read an earlier U.S. book on Khrushchev's arms control motivations remarked that the study "worked too hard to find a logical explanation for disarmament proposals that were turned out perfunctorily by the middle echelons of the Soviet Foreign Ministry."²³

There are, however, increasing signs of an emerging Soviet arms control coalition loosely made up of civilian scientists like Sakharov, economic rationalizers like Premier Kosygin and his associates, and various figures in the Foreign Ministry, all of whom share bureaucratic or political interests in a moderation of the arms competition.²⁴ Yet any such emergent arms control groups probably remain at best loose associations of individuals with little formal charter or authority.²⁵ Accordingly, it may be an exaggeration to call any such entity, at least yet, a Soviet arms control "establishment." Nevertheless, there are clusters of individuals and institutional subgroups within the Soviet system which, over time, have been primarily preoccupied with matters of

²³Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations*, (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1968), p. 13.

²⁴See the chapter "The Arms Control Issue in the Soviet Political Context," in the forthcoming study by Roman Kolkowicz, Matthew P. Gallagher, and Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

²⁵See, for example, "A Note on Soviet Policy-Making on Arms Control and Disarmament," in Alexander Dallin et al., *The Soviet Union, Arms Control, and Disarmament*, (Columbia University: School of International Affairs, 1964), pp. 60-64.

arms control and disarmament. However fragmented they may be, it is arguable that they constitute at least a rudimentary arms control constituency.

The most visible locus of Soviet arms control research is the disarmament group headed by Igor Glagolev within the Institute of World Economics and International Relations. One may question the access and influence this group enjoys, but it can at least claim the status of a community, a status generally denied to most policy coalitions in the Soviet Union. Glagolev himself has visited American research centers like RAND on several occasions to discuss the disarmament dimensions of Soviet-American relations, presumably on the approval of the Party. It is hard to imagine otherwise, given the tight controls the Soviet security establishment enforces over such exchanges.

A related point concerns the role of the Americanologists as a source of counsel to the Party, and especially that of their leading representative, Georgii Arbatov. It has been reported that Arbatov commands greater access than his institutional status would suggest and that he is a trusted adviser to Premier Kosygin.²⁶ To this extent, it seems pertinent to examine his statements and writings for possible insights into the sort of analytic inputs that are now being provided to the Soviet leadership.

In a concluding session of the most recent Pugwash Conference held last October in the Crimea, which he co-chaired with an American arms control specialist, George Rathjens,²⁷ Arbatov endorsed a joint resolution highlighting the dangers of continued arms competition. This

²⁶Another less well-known Americanologist is Viktor Komplektov, a diplomat in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Formerly First Secretary to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Komplektov is now an adviser to the Soviet arms control team. His role as an Americanologist on the Soviet delegation appears to be analogous to that of Raymond Garthoff on the American side. Garthoff, a State Department official with respected credentials as a Soviet military specialist, is executive secretary of the U.S. negotiating team.

²⁷Rathjens, a former director of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, is the author of *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970s*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969).

resolution suggested a moratorium on multiple warhead deployment as the most promising basis upon which to develop an arms reduction dialogue between the superpowers.²⁸ The political meaning of this public stance by Arbatov can only be guessed at. Yet the overall findings of the conference--held, significantly enough, in the Soviet Union at precisely the time Washington and Moscow were moving toward their initial arms negotiating sessions--were undoubtedly brought to the attention of the Soviet leadership. Whatever report Arbatov may have delivered to his Kremlin sponsors after the fact probably contained a reasoned argument for proceeding with an arms dialogue with the United States, coupled with a warning that some groups within the American defense establishment might prove to be a significant obstacle to progress.²⁹

The fact that there appears to be a gathering consensus within the Kremlin to support the unfolding arms control negotiations suggests that a majority of Soviet leaders believe such an approach may have something to offer and that there is little to be lost by trying. It would probably be wrong to attribute the main credit for this consensus to the "arms control lobby" as I have defined it above. There are other considerations that also weigh on the Soviet leadership and quite likely account for a lion's share of the explanation. One is an increasingly felt need to relieve the drain on resources which the arms competition has imposed. Another, at least to some Soviet politicians, might be the seeming illogic of continuing to build up nuclear forces when both

²⁸Available information on the proceedings of the conference is sparse, since the ground rules required all presentations and exchanges to remain off the record. Among the other American participants were Marshall Shulman, director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, and Albert Wohlstetter, a prominent defense specialist at the University of Chicago. See Walter Sullivan, "Pugwash Parley in Sochi Told of Argentina's Nuclear Plans," *New York Times*, October 27, 1969. Hans Morgenthau also attended and has provided some interesting remarks on the general flavor of the discussions in his "trip report," "From Napoleon to Armageddon," *New York Review of Books*, February 26, 1970, pp. 38-43.

²⁹There is the alternative possibility that Arbatov's remarks had prior approval and may have been intended as a quasi-official expression of more authoritative Soviet thinking. In either event, it is unlikely that Arbatov was solely expounding his personal views.

superpowers already have more than enough weapons to assure a stable relationship based on mutual deterrence.

Finally, one cannot rule out considerations of personal reputation and political interest. Premier Kosygin, for example, has allowed himself to become publicly identified as a proponent of arms control. Given the vagaries of Soviet politics, it seems likely that having staked his career on that position, he will continue to maintain it as long as doing so proves politically prudent.

As in the case of the military intellectual lobby, we can prove the existence of a Soviet arms control establishment and demonstrate its involvement at least at the margins of Soviet policy. Yet we can say little about its ultimate political role and effect. Nevertheless, it remains analytically useful to be able to identify and describe such a community. In doing so, we not only raise valid questions about the common cliché that the Soviet Union speaks with a single voice on defense matters; we also provide added insight into the institutional latticework of Soviet political-military decisionmaking.

IV. OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented above suggests that the Soviet Union has indeed acquired a "defense intelligentsia" loosely analogous to that which has dominated American strategic debate over the past decade. This development lends considerable support to those who maintain that the demands of modern technology and strategy affect all major powers equally, regardless of their ideological or governmental peculiarities. Proponents of the view that the United States and the Soviet Union are somehow inexorably converging in their respective values, institutions, and styles, however, would be ill-advised to seek support from the example of the defense intellectuals. Although Moscow's defense experts have been partly engendered simply as a natural outgrowth of the imperatives of the nuclear age, they have also been heavily conditioned and circumscribed by the strictures of an authoritarian political environment. As such, they must be viewed as a uniquely Soviet phenomenon.

Generalizations about the Soviet defense intelligentsia remain difficult to come by. Indeed, the most salient characteristic of this community is its heterogeneity. Moscow's defense intellectuals differ widely, for example, in their political values. Some, such as the institutional academics, view a stable nuclear balance formalized and ratified by arms control as the most desirable framework for relations between the two superpowers. Others, notably the "Red hawks," seem to regard this notion as blatantly accommodative to the West and one which, if accepted, would rob Soviet foreign policy of its initiative and dynamism.

Similarly, the Soviet defense intellectuals disagree widely in their views of the United States as a strategic competitor and in their attitudes regarding the political value of nuclear arms. The civilian analysts tend to regard American policymakers as self-interested but sensible men with whom reasonable agreements can be struck. These scholars base their conclusions largely on the belief that mutual

deterrence has deprived nuclear weapons of any significant political leverage. Their military counterparts, by contrast, retain a pervasive distrust of what they regard as an intractable American adversary. These strategists continue to place faith in the traditional military belief that the Soviet state should be prepared to fight a nuclear war to victory should deterrence fail.

Moscow's defense specialists also diverge in their respective institutional settings, organizational interests, and political functions. As a result, they do not lend themselves very suitably toward consideration as a coherent group. They serve different constituencies, wield dissimilar and often shifting political mandates, address different audiences, command varying levels of authoritativeness, and enjoy uneven degrees of access and influence. The military defense intellectuals, for example, appear to enjoy a measure of bureaucratic support from the High Command which seems to have been denied to their civilian counterparts in the Academy of Sciences. Thus, when the "Red hawks" advance their provocative policy prescriptions, one can assume that they are speaking for more authoritative military figures. By contrast, arms controllers like Glagolev and company cannot count on the backing of similarly powerful benefactors and must temper their advocacy accordingly. At the opposite extreme, even such notables as Academician Sakharov must, in the main, rely on underground channels to promote their personal views on strategy, since their primary function as something other than defense commentators does not allow them the political license to do so publicly.

Moreover, the levels of access available to each broad category of Soviet defense intellectuals appear to be dissimilar. Although we cannot say for sure, it appears that the uniformed analysts are well situated to express their views indirectly, through their more well-placed military superiors, while the civilians are obliged to take the less assured route of communicating directly to their primary audiences in the Party. Analysts like Arbatov who enjoy close personal contact with the leadership should be viewed as exceptions. As a rule, however,

it seems that in terms of institutional leverage, the military voice holds a perceptible edge over that of the institutional academics.

Finally, Moscow's defense intellectuals, military and civilian alike, display highly uneven public profiles. Some, such as Arbatov, Marshal Sokolovskii, and General Talenskii are widely known to any close reader of Western accounts of Soviet foreign and defense policy. Most of the institutional academics and "Red hawks," by contrast, are familiar only to the smaller community of professional students of Soviet affairs. This distinction may apply for observers within the Soviet Union as well. Among both groups, those discernible *by us* as defense intellectuals may constitute only the tip of a larger iceberg. As such, they may not be wholly representative of their unseen, yet perhaps even more influential, colleagues behind the scenes. To underscore this, we need only recall the case of the Soviet arms control negotiating team, whose recently announced members include a contingent of technical experts who were previously unheard of in the West. For all these reasons, any effort to generalize about the role and influence of Moscow's defense intelligentsia would, at this point, be premature.

If, on the other hand, we regard these defense intellectuals as institutional manifestations of a developing political system rather than as bellwethers of future directions in Soviet policy, then we can suggest some legitimate and even interesting generalizations. At the outset, I suggested that the demands of modern statecraft should have made the emergence of a Soviet defense intelligentsia an altogether natural response to the complex problems that have accompanied the unfolding of the nuclear age. There is nothing in the evidence presented above that would refute this hypothesis. Although the considerable differences among Moscow's defense intellectuals in terms of policy outlook and political role preclude our characterizing them as a discrete "group," there is every reason to regard them as a more aggregated community within the Soviet polity.¹

¹For a useful breakdown of the views held by various Soviet defense intellectuals, see Franklyn J. C. Griffiths, "Inner Tensions in the Soviet Approach to 'Disarmament,'" *International Journal*, Autumn 1967, pp. 593-617.

Whatever disagreements they may harbor, Moscow's defense intellectuals all enjoy the status of elites within the system and share a common preoccupation with the policy dimensions of Soviet strategy. Second, they share a style of analysis which emphasizes pragmatic rather than ideological factors. Although they have yet to attain the methodological erudition in which some of their American counterparts pride themselves, a failure which skeptics of Western "conflict theory" might suggest has been to their credit, the Soviet defense intellectuals are well versed in Western strategic thought.

Third, Moscow's strategic experts share common educational backgrounds. Most hold advanced degrees in the social or technical sciences, and all observe the conventions of scholarly research. As such, they comprise an intellectual caste that stands apart from the Party's functionaries and the military's commanders and managers, the latter of whose concerns are more operational than analytical. Fourth, the Soviet defense intellectuals are products of a common secular trend, namely, the growing permissiveness of post-Stalin Soviet political life and the mounting technical complexities of modern war. Finally, regardless of their personal biases, the Soviet defense intellectuals are united in their commitment to Soviet security and are uniformly persuaded of the need to maintain a strong military counterweight against the West.

As we contemplate the future of Soviet politics, what can we learn from the case of Moscow's defense intellectuals and the circumstances that have produced them? And how might these lessons be sharpened by a comparative reflection on the American experience? I began this paper by singling out the U.S. defense intelligentsia as a paradigm of the phenomenon and suggesting that the sorts of forces that had engendered it would likely bear with equal force on the Soviet Union. Having done that, it seems appropriate in conclusion to follow through with at least a cursory comment of how the Soviet defense intellectuals have measured up to the American model as a sociopolitical development.

Briefly put, although Soviet and American defense intellectuals have many characteristics in common, they differ fundamentally in their respective social and political functions. This should not be surprising considering the stark contrasts between the Soviet and American systems. In both the American and Soviet cases, the demands for expert advice have tended to heighten the technical capabilities of the affected skill groups and have provided a ready avenue for defense intellectuals to enter the corridors of power. In the United States, with its pluralist political process, however, the result has been to create what Senator Hubert Humphrey once called a confrontation of "countervailing expertise."² As both elected and appointed officials have grown less and less capable of coping with the demands of modern strategy without technical help, defense decisionmaking has become more and more the province of a narrow circle of skilled specialists, leading some observers to perceive an incipient "government by experts" harboring a serious threat to traditional democratic values.³

Defenders of the civilian strategists, notably former Defense Secretary McNamara and his associates, have staunchly countered this with the argument that a credible repository of expertise outside the uniformed ranks permits both enhanced civilian control of the military and a check against policies that might otherwise be more inclined to serve the parochial interests of the individual services than the broader interests of American security. Critics of this view reply that it is less the uniform one wears than the power he wields that is worrisome. Whether or not they are correct in alleging that the decline in public accountability on the part of America's "national security managers"⁴ has entailed a concomitant erosion of their social

²Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, "The Senate in Foreign Policy," in Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, eds., *Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 161.

³For an extreme example, see the withering attack against Bruce L. R. Smith's *The RAND Corporation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) in Philip Green's review, "Science, Government, and the Case of RAND: A Singular Pluralism," *World Politics*, January 1969, pp. 301-326. A more tempered expression of the same thesis can be found in H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science* (New York: Quadrangle Press, 1966).

⁴The term is Richard J. Barnet's. See his *Intervention and Revolution* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 23.

responsibility, there is little question that the concentration of expertise within the defense bureaucracy has narrowed the channels of access to government authority and encouraged a great deal of decisionmaking beneath public scrutiny.⁵

In the Soviet Union, exactly the opposite has happened. Far from being a *consequence* of the heightened premium placed on technical expertise, the centralization and closure of Soviet decisionmaking was both an antecedent and a cause of that development. In contrast with the American case, the mounting need for specialized skills has dramatized the growing inability of career Party functionaries to cope with the increasingly complex problems facing Soviet national security planners. The result has been a steady erosion of the Party's omniscience, a gradual diffusion of policymaking responsibility, and the emergence of growing pluralism in Soviet defense politics.

Beyond that, the Party's former latitude for imposing its will over other groups arbitrarily has become increasingly limited by its growing dependence on the experts, yielding a significant, if gradual, alteration in the nature of Soviet government. Sources of interest articulation have multiplied, new channels of access to top decisionmakers have been opened, and the entire scope of the Soviet political process has been broadened. The pressures that have occasioned the rise of Moscow's defense intellectuals have, at the same

⁵One could cite as a trend in the opposite direction the public debate which arose over the Nixon Administration's decision last year to deploy the Safeguard antiballistic missile system. Yet the American multiple warhead program, by far a more strategically significant development, has escaped serious discussion outside the narrow confines of the American defense community. For the most part, because of its highly technical content, U.S. strategic policy still remains an exclusive preserve of the bureaucratic and defense-specialist elite. The alleged anti-democratic nature of this policy approach and the asserted speciousness of its "scientific" underpinnings have come under increasing criticism from some academic quarters. See, for example, Philip Green, *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966). For a well-argued defense of the strategic experts, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Scientists, Seers, and Strategy," in Wesley W. Posvar et al., eds., *American Defense Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 193-201.

time, transformed the Soviet state from a monolithic Leviathan to what Robert Dahl has called a "polyarchical" system.⁶ To sum up the contrast in a nutshell, the emergence of a defense intelligentsia in the United States has tended to hinder the development of institutional pluralism. In the Soviet Union, the same phenomenon has served to accelerate it.⁷

Lest one conclude from this that the USSR is progressing toward some form of parliamentary egalitarianism, we must remember that the Soviet system remains dominated by one-party authoritarian rule. The broadening of its governmental process has in no way advanced beyond what Gordon Skilling has termed a "pluralism of elites."⁸ In the defense realm, as in all other areas, Soviet decisionmaking remains oligarchic rather than democratic. The Communist Party, and particularly the Politburo, remains the ultimate arbitrator of national policy. Its members may call on their experts from time to time when they need help, but it remains they, and not the specialists, who must continue to command the predominant attention of Western analysts.

⁶Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 63.

⁷Yet in the Soviet Union and the United States alike, the defense intellectuals retain one characteristic in common, namely, the disdain with which they are viewed by many senior officers who perceive their own influence to be threatened. Such an American attitude toward the scholar-strategists was reflected in this broadside by retired Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White: "In common with many other military men, active and retired, I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional defense intellectuals who have been brought into this Nation's capital. I don't believe a lot of these often over-confident, sometimes arrogant young professors, mathematicians, and other theorists have sufficient worldliness of motivation to stand up to the kind of enemy we face." "Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals," *Saturday Evening Post*, May 4, 1963, pp. 10-12. A similar view of the Soviet defense intellectuals may have been captured in this expression by Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov: "Disproportionate stress on theoretical training may lead to the separation of officers from life, may transform them into scholastics who do not understand life at all but are capable only of citing the book." *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 30, 1963.

⁸Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, April 1966, p. 449.

Nevertheless, the recent emergence of a defense intelligentsia has been a notable phenomenon in Soviet political development. What this implies for the long term remains a subject of widespread contention among Western Sovietologists. Most would agree with Zbigniew Brzezinski that "the progressive transformation of the bureaucratic Communist dictatorship into a more pluralistic and institutionalized political system--even though still a system of one-party rule--seems essential if its degeneration is to be avoided."⁹ A few, among them the respected Kremlinologist Michel Tatu, would even go so far as to view the emergence of some sort of "parliamentarism" as an inexorable consequence of the current stresses at work within the Soviet system--although allowing for the likelihood that such a development may encounter severe setbacks along the way.¹⁰

This larger debate over the question of whether the Soviet system involves a tangle of issues which I will not attempt to sort out here. What matters for present purposes is that a discernible Soviet defense intelligentsia has come to exist. It has been directly occasioned by the state's need for competent analysts to help deal with an increasingly complex strategic environment. Insofar as the demands created by this environment can only be expected to intensify, the defense intellectuals will become increasingly important fixtures on the Soviet political landscape. Their role and influence will vary, no doubt, with the shifting winds of internal Soviet political life. Under Khrushchev, for example, the civilian academics were given a fair amount

⁹"The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" in Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 34. It is hard to believe that this mounting need remains unrecognized by the Soviet elite. As early as 1928, Bukharin indicated his appreciation of it in the closing words of his speech to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern: "Discipline in our party is the highest rule. But I want to quote an unpublished letter which Lenin sent to me and Zinoviev. Lenin writes: 'If you chase all intelligent people who are not very pliable, and only keep obedient idiots, then you will certainly ruin the party.'" Cited in Franz Borkenau, *World Communism* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1939), p. 337.

¹⁰Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), pp. 538-539.

of latitude to speak out on sensitive national issues, while the military's intellectuals remained held on a fairly tight leash.¹¹ With the harder line now being adopted by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, the visibility and access of the civilian defense intellectuals seem to have been eclipsed perceptibly at the same time that military involvement in Soviet defense politics has appeared to be on the rise.

Simply put, whatever need the Party may have for the expert advice and counsel of its defense intellectuals, the latter flourish and participate in high politics solely at the sufferance of the regime. That said, however, the day is long past when the leadership could frame its policies simply by consulting the familiar slogans of Marxism-Leninism. To this extent, the Kremlin's defense intellectuals are here to stay.

¹¹See, respectively, William Zimmerman, "International Relations in the Soviet Union: The Emergence of a Discipline," *Journal of Politics*, February 1969, pp. 52-70, and Roman Kolkowicz, *Conflicts in Soviet Party-Military Relations: 1962-1963* (The RAND Corporation, RM-3760-PR, August 1963).